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ABSTRACT
The Council of Basel (around 1431-1435) was one of the key moments of 15th Century 
political and religious tensions, preparing the time of the Reformation and its confes-
sional religious wars. On the Council, the confl ict between the reform-party of the Coun-
ciliarists and the more conservative defenders of papal authority, prepared already in 14th 
Century, came to a climax. At the end, the confl ict escalated in such a way, that the Coun-
cil broke up, it  was even never offi cially closed. Together with the Fall of Constantinople 
in 1453, the Council was one of the most infl uential events leading to the breakdown of 
medieval order. 
In the fi rst stage of the Council, the young canonical lawyer Nicholas of Cusa set up 
for being one of the mediating participants, able to install reconciliation between the con-
fl icting parties. In his book De concordantia catholica the later cardinal and philosopher, 
developed a compromise between the two confl icting concepts of church and society. In 
this contribution I will fi rst of all analyze the concept of reconciliation (concordantia) 
against the background of the confl icts of the time. Secondly I will show that Cusanus 
failed become the third party, a role which he wished to play in the chaos of the confl ict. 
Furthermore, I will show that this failure meant for Cusanus the starting point for a new 
way of thinking about confl ict and reconciliation. Some years later, he seems to have 
translated his model of reconciliation into a more spiritual paradigm of concordantia, as 
it becomes clear in his book on the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. 
In the view of Cusanus, there never can be a “third party” which is not one of the 
two confl icting partners. In a way, the whole of Nicholas’ philosophical project can be 
seen as an attempt to deal with this concrete political – and paradoxical – experience. 
For Cusanus this inability to fi nd an external neutral position requires a new logical and 
epistemological framework. 
As such we can fi nd in Cusanus both the concrete wrestling with the search for the 
position of a reconciling third party as well as a early modern political theory, attempt-
ing to solve older metaphysical paradigms and preparing modern political models at the 
same time.
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LA TERZA PARTE È NECESSARIAMENTE COINVOLTA NEL CONFLITTO.
LA RIFORMA FRA IL CONCILIO DI BASILEA E LA CADUTA DI 
COSTANTINOPOLI
 
SINTESI 
Il Concilio di Basilea (tenutosi fra il 1431 e il 1435) fu un momento chiave per le 
tensioni politiche e religiose nel XV secolo, anticipatore della Riforma e delle guerre 
religiose fra le diverse confessioni. Durante il Concilio, infatti, il confl itto fra la fazione 
pro-riforma dei Conciliaristi e quella più conservatrice dei difensori dell'autorità papale, 
cominciato già nel XIV secolo, giunse ad un apice. Infi ne, la contrapposizione si inasprì 
a tal punto da far fallire il Concilio, il quale invero non fu mai dichiarato uffi cialmente 
concluso. Assieme alla caduta di Costantinopoli nel 1453, il Concilio fu uno degli eventi 
di maggior infl uenza nella defi nitiva rottura dell'ordine medievale.
Nella prima fase del Concilio il giovane giurista canonico Niccolò Cusano si distinse 
come uno dei partecipanti di indole mediatrice, capace di indurre la riconciliazione fra le 
parti in confl itto. Nella sua opera De concordantia catholica il futuro cardinale e fi losofo 
elaborò un compromesso fra le opposte visioni in campo circa la chiesa e la società. In 
questo intervento analizzerò innanzitutto il concetto di riconciliazione (concordantia) 
sullo sfondo dei confl itti dell'epoca. In secondo luogo mostrerò come Cusano non riuscì 
ad imporsi quale terza parte, un ruolo a cui ambiva considerata la confusione generata 
dal confl itto. Inoltre, farò vedere come questo fallimento venne vissuto da Cusano come 
punto di partenza per un nuovo modo di ragionare sul confl itto e sulla riconciliazione. 
Alcuni anni più tardi pare infatti avesse tradotto il suo modello di riconciliazione in un 
paradigma più spirituale di concordantia, come risulta evidente dalla suo opera sulla 
caduta di Costantinopoli nel 1453.
Nella visione di Cusano non può esistere in alcun caso una “terza parte” che non 
sia una delle due parti in confl itto. In un certo senso, l'essenza del progetto fi losofi co di 
Niccolò Cusano può essere visto come un tentativo di trattare tale esperienza politica 
concreta, nonché paradossale. Secondo Cusano questa impossibilità di individuare una 
posizione esterna e neutrale abbisognava di una nuova impalcatura logica ed epistemo-
logica.
In questa prospettiva, possiamo trovare nel pensiero di Cusano sia lo sforzo concreto 
di ricercare la posizione conciliante d'una terza parte, sia una prima teoria politica, nel 
tentativo ad un sol tempo di risolvere antichi paradigmi metafi sici e di preparare moderni 
modelli politici.
Parole chiave: Concilio di Basilea, caduta di Costantinopoli, Niccolò Cusano, terza parte
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The increasing awareness of the original and irreducible power of confl icts belongs 
to the main characteristic of modern culture. In a sense, “confl ict” became the key word 
of the new paradigm of social and cultural rationality at least since Thomas Hobbes and 
his political theory of sovereignty entered the stage of European history. Challenged by 
the experience of the not ending religious and confessional wars in Early modern Europe, 
Hobbes reinterpreted the whole of human society – now not anymore deducing the human 
order from the order of being – but from the unavoidable character of confl ict. Whereas 
in pre-modern time confl icts were accidental expressions of the fact that the order of be-
ing was not realized yet, Hobbes saw in the possibility of confl ict the original nature of 
human beings. Within this paradigm, social and moral confl icts only can be resolved by 
the sovereign, taking a neutral position from the outside – a secularized, mortal God – as 
Hobbes mentions in his Leviathan. The necessity of a neutral position outside the con-
fl icting parties, is since Hobbes the founding idea of social and moral reconciliation. E.g. 
in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, this fi gure returns in the metaphor of the Judge – the 
Judge of critical reason, which is the only legitimate Judge in the battle fi eld of metaphys-
ical, ontological and religious ideas and visions. The philosophy of Kant may be partly a 
critical correction of the authoritarian model of Hobbes – nevertheless, both models are 
characterized by the idea that confl icts only can be resolved by an instance outside the 
battlefi eld of confl icting parties. In recent years there has been a lot of scholarly research 
to the metaphor of the Judge in modern philosophy, science and political theory Moder-
nity is often characterized by the strong conviction that confl icting moral and religious 
parties need a judge, taking an external and neutral position, an instance which is not 
involved in the confl ict itself. Today, this model seems to be questioned again. We are not 
sure anymore whether the liberal state, with its neutral public space, reconciling differ-
ent moral positions, is still able to claim the neutral position – to deliver the view from 
nowhere, as Thomas Nagel (1986) calls it. Is it really possible to fi nd such a position, or 
is this (liberal) claim nothing else than a hidden ideological construct?
We are struggling today with this neutral, external position. Therefore it is of interest 
to look back deeper into history, in order to develop a more sophisticated way of defi ning 
the neutral position of the third party – to the 15th Century, where we meet the famous 
philosopher and Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (Cusanus, 1401-1464) (Christianson, 2008). 
Being the most important philosopher of 15th Century, as well as one of the leading prac-
tical politicians of his time, Nicholas of Cusa was confronted again and again with the 
inability to determine a neutral deciding position within different confl icts, and these both 
in a theoretical and practical way. For both in his biography as well as in his theoretical 
works, Nicholas of Cusa discussed the question how to solve confl icts between human 
beings. First of all I will discuss the role of Nicholas of Cusa at the famous council of 
Basel (around 1430), in a second paragraph, I will show how Cusanus develops his model 
of reconciliation (concordia) by referring to his interpretation of another historical event 
of the 15th Century, of which he was one of the important witnesses – the Fall of Con-
stantinopel. In a third part – my conclusion – I will show how in the work of Cusanus, 
it is not the fi gure of the Judge, which is the central metaphor, but far more the fi gure of 
the lawyer, defending his client in the awareness of the perspective of his opponent – no 
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human being ever can take the place of a judge – even if we have to judge as if one is a 
judge – as the best lawyers are able to do.
CONCORDANTIA – THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COUNCILIARISTS 
AND PAPALISTS AT THE COUNCIL OF BASEL
The Council of Basel was, without any doubt, one of the key moments in the history 
of 15th Century political and religious tensions – preparing the time of the Reformation 
and its confessional religious wars. It was on this Council – which never was closed of-
fi cially, that the elder confl ict between the reform party of the Counciliarists and the con-
servative defenders of papal authority, found its climax. At the end, the confl ict escalated 
in such a way that the Council broke up – without any concrete result. The conservative 
party, defending the authority of the pope, continued the Council in Ferrara and Florence, 
whereas some reform members stayed in Basel, neither with any result (Meuthen, 1994).
In the fi rst stage of the Council, the young canonical lawyer Nicholas of Cusa, set 
up for being one of the mediating participants, able to install reconciliation between the 
confl icting parties. Even if it is often said by scholars, that Cusanus was one of the main 
representatives of the Reform party, it was his fi rst aim to fi nd ways in order to restore 
the harmony between the two parties, to bridge the gap between the counciliarists and 
the curialists. Given the radical attitude of both the reform party, and the pope, the mis-
sion of Cusanus was deemed to fail. Nevertheless, this failure can be seen as a splendid 
failure, for it resulted in one of the most marvelous books in late medieval respectively 
early modern political theory – De concordantia catholica, a book containing a mixture 
between historical refl ections on the development of ideas and conceptions of ecclesial 
governance in relation to justice and truth, and some proposals to reform the church in 
such a way that papal authority could be combined with an almost democratic system of 
multi-leveled consent. There has been done a lot of research on the political model, pro-
posed in the De concordantia catholica, but still more has to be done – for it seems to me 
that in this book, Cusanus is very well aware of the main problem of late medieval soci-
ety, leading into modernity – the awareness of the lack of a deciding instance, an ultimate 
measure, founding the concordance of society, respectively the Church, and ways to deal 
with it (Christianson, 2004). The book combines a hierarchical model of thinking with a 
democratic model of consent, in which the consent of every participant is needed – only 
where there is concordance, as Cusanus mentions in his book, there is God. The social re-
spectively ecclesial order never can be deduced from a divine order – nevertheless – there 
is an ultimate divine order, transcending human forms of order and judging these. At the 
same time – it is never possible for human beings to have knowledge of these judgments. 
There is no one who can claim to be the representative of these ultimate measure.
The clash between counciliarists and papal party was of such an intensity, that the 
fascinating attempt of Cusanus to install a system combining both model (the vertical 
and the horizontal one) only could fail. Cusanus was very well aware of the anomaly of 
his system – the confl ict between the two models, which was in fact the concrete confl ict 
between the two parties. Cusanus left the Basel Council – supposedly in a disappointed 
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way, but he would never forget these experiences, leading to his refl ections in De concor-
dantia catholica. They return later on, in a new challenging confl ict – the confl ict between 
the Muslims and the Christians at the occasion of the Fall of Constantinople in 1453. In 
a way, this confl ict showed Cusanus new ways to think further on his model of confl ict 
and reconciliation. 
CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS
Only some weeks after the Fall of Constantinople on May 29 1453, Nicholas of Cusa 
writes his book De pace fi dei – The Peace of Faith – the work contains nothing less than 
a premodern vision on the reconciliation between different religious and cultural  tradi-
tions. Cusanus describes a kind of peace conference between all possible cultures and re-
ligions, known at that moment. Place of the event is the Heavenly Jerusalem – all nations 
sent their best and wisest representatives in order to fi nd reconciliation around the throne 
of the heavenly king (Hoye, 2004; Watanabe, 2001). They are all shocked by the violence 
by religious people in the name of God and agree at least in one point, that violence never 
can be real content of religion. On the contrary – the Hindu, the Muslim, the Christian, 
the Greek etc. are very well aware of the fact that they are at the end searching for the 
same – the una religio in rituum varietate – The one religion in the diversity of rites and 
habits. Many readers of the De pace fi dei wonder that they seem to fi nd in Cusanus an 
early representative of Enlightenment religion theory, searching for the religion of reason, 
leaving behind concrete and sensitive imagination – as we can fi nd e.g. in Spinoza. And 
they seem to have right, when the dialogue partners in the heavenly Jerusalem agree that 
the cause of violence is not religion in itself, but far more the fact that human beings are 
always in danger to be fi xed on old habits and images and to take these for truth itself. The 
dialogue partners intend to search the common truth of all these habits and images, used 
by human beings in order to be directed towards the Divine.
It is however exactly at this point that Cusanus goes into a direction, different from 
that of Enlightenment philosophy – for at the end of the dialogue, the representatives go 
back to their home country in order to translate the new insights into the original language 
of their religion. In other words, Cusanus is not searching for a new unifi ed religion of 
reason. This is so, because of practical reasons – most people neither have time nor the 
intellectual capacity to go beyond their habits and images – but also because of a funda-
mental theoretical insight – namely the fact that at the end it is impossible ever to leave 
the realm of imagination. Even the most sophisticated rational or philosophical content 
of religion is at the end in itself an image, differing from divine truth as it is. Even the 
attempt to articulate the una religio, the ultimate measure of all religious habits and im-
ages, is an image in itself. People never are able to leave the realm of imagination. There 
is in other words, no possibility to take a neutral position from the outside. There is no 
arbiter, no judge, who is able to criticize the different images of divine truth. Therefore it 
is impossible for human beings to leave their own concrete perspective. Every attempt to 
claim the position of the third party presupposes that the one who does this, is involved 
in the process of itself.
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What is possible is that the Christian is able to understand the position of the Muslim 
or the Hindu within his own perspective. There is no public measure, allowing to deter-
mine which position is the best – but this inaccessibility of divine truth seems to become 
the real criterion of the own truth: For inasmuch the Christian (or the Muslim, Hindu etc.) 
attempts to understand the truth of the other, he necessarily attempts to understand the 
truth of the other as if it were his own truth. We see this e.g. in the discussion concerning 
Trinity and Monotheism, which is – of course – one of the main discussion points in the 
Heavenly Jerusalem. Since we need, according to Cusanus, the principle of pia interpre-
tatio – the interpretation of benevolence – the Christian with his Trinitarian conviction 
can learn from the Muslim not to forget the oneness of God – and the same is true for the 
discussion with the polytheism of the Hindus: polytheism shows the Christian, attempting 
to understand divine truth, that the one God only can be reached through a multitude of 
experiences and images. Thus in understanding the position of the other, the proper per-
spective can become richer and stronger. In being able to affi rm the position of the other, 
the proper perspective shows its strength and realism. Cusanus does not deny that the 
other traditions are able to live with a pia interpretatio as well – but he does not elaborate 
this. I think this is not a problem. Pia interpretatio presupposes the ultimate inaccessibil-
ity of divine truth, and therefore the awareness that other traditions may have a relation 
towards truth too.
Inasmuch, the position of the third party is not accessible, there is no other way in 
order to fi nd reconciliation than in the attempt to understand the truth of the other in our 
own way and to leave open the possibility (and even the necessity) that other traditions 
do the same from within their own perspective. The more we know that the other is able 
to do this too, the stronger the own perspective gets. The stronger our own perspective is 
in this respect, the more reconciliation and acknowledgment of the other can be realized. 
Therefore, it is the inaccessibility of the neutral position from the outside, which is the 
real criterion for reconciliation. It is at this point that Cusanus differs from the different 
positions of Enlightenment philosophy. We are never able to take such a position. Always 
when we try it, we are still bound to our own perspective, living with concrete images and 
habits. This fact has to be recognized. Otherwise, reconciliation is not possible. 
THE LAWYER AND THE THIRD PARTY 
As a conclusion I want to say that in this respect, the central metaphor for Cusanus 
is not that of the Judge. The “real Judge” at the end is God himself. But God remains 
necessarily hidden. Nevertheless, according to Cusanus, we are involved in our relation 
towards the hidden God, through our concrete images and habits. The central fi gure in 
the paradigm of Cusanus is that of the lawyer. The lawyer is oriented towards the Judge, 
inasmuch he has to convince the judge of his own truth, showing that his perspective is 
the right perspective. At the same time, it is the best lawyer, who is able to understand that 
the other party has important points and arguments. The best perspective is that, which 
enables to integrate the good elements of the other. Today, Cusanus could be accused of 
an attempt to reduce otherness to his own perspective. I do not agree with this. Inasmuch 
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as we understand Cusanus’ position against the background of the fi gure of the lawyer 
(we may not forget that Cusanus was a lawyer himself), the recognition of the other is 
presupposed in the attempt to understand other’s position in terms of the own position.
I think this way of thinking could be helpful in an era in which the lack of an ultimate 
“third party” is experienced in an often dramatic way. The absence of such a position is 
one of the main problems of modern moral and religious situation. Therefore the fi gure of 
the lawyer, as we can fi nd in Cusanus, has to be taken very serious. 
TRETJA STRANKA JE NUJNO VKLJUČENA V SPOR.
REFORMA MED BASELSKIM KONCILOM IN PADCEM 
KONSTANTINOPLA
Inigo BOCKEN
Radboud University Nijmegen, Erasmusplein 1, 6525 HT Nijmegen, Nizozemska
e-mail: i.bocken@ftr.ru.nl
POVZETEK
Baselski koncil (okrog 1431-1435) je bil eden od ključnih trenutkov političnih in 
verskih napetosti 15. stoletja, ki je napovedal obdobje reformacije in verskih vojn med 
različnimi veroizpovedmi. Na njem je spor med reformatorsko stranko zagovornikov 
oblasti cerkvenega zbora in bolj konzervativnimi zagovorniki papeške oblasti, ki se je 
vnel že v 14. stoletju, dosegel vrhunec. Nazadnje se je tako zaostril, da se je koncil razšel 
in ni bil nikoli uradno zaključen. Poleg padca Konstantinopla leta 1453 je bil koncil eden 
najvplivnejših dogodkov, ki je vodil do razpada srednjeveškega reda. V prvi fazi koncila je 
mlad kanonski pravnik Nikolaj iz Kuze želel postati eden od posrednikov, ki bi jim uspelo 
doseči spravo med nasprotnima stranema. V svojem delu De concordantia catholica je 
poznejši kardinal in fi lozof razvil kompromis med dvema nasprotujočima si konceptoma 
cerkve in družbe.
V pričujočem prispevku avtor najprej analizira koncept sprave (concordantia), ki 
se je pojavil v ozadju takratnih konfl iktov, nato pokaže, da Kuzancu ni uspelo postati 
tretja stranka oziroma prevzeti vloge, ki jo je želel igrati v zmedi tega spora. Avtor tudi 
pojasni, kako je ta neuspeh zanj pomenil izhodišče za nov način razmišljanja o sporu 
in spravi. Zdi se, da je nekaj let kasneje svoj model sprave prevedel v bolj duhovno 
paradigmo concordantiae, kot je razvidno iz njegovega dela o turškem zavzetju Kon-
stantinopla leta 1453.
Po Kuzančevem mnenju ne more obstajati “tretja stranka”, ki ne bi bila na strani 
enega od obeh partnerjev v sporu. Na nek način lahko njegov celoten fi lozofski projekt 
razumemo kot poskus spopasti se s to konkretno politično – in protislovno – izkušnjo. Za 
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Nikolaja Kuzanskega ta nezmožnost najti nevtralni položaj izven spora zahteva nov logič-
ni in epistemološki okvir. Pri Kuzancu lahko tako opazimo konkreten boj z iskanjem po-
ložaja za tretjo stranko, ki bi spravila strani v sporu, kot tudi zgodnjenovoveško politično 
teorijo, s katero si je prizadeval rešiti starejše metafi zične paradigme in hkrati pripraviti 
moderne politične modele.
Ključne besede: Baselski koncil, padec Konstantinopla, Nikolaj iz Kuze, tretja stranka
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Christianson, G. (2004): Cusanus, Cesarini and the Crisis of Conciliarism. In: Bocken, 
I. (ed.): Confl ict and Reconciliation. Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa. Leiden, Brilll, 
91–106. 
Christianson, G. et al. (eds.) (2008): The Church, the Councils and Reform. The Legacy 
of the Fifteenth Century. Washington, The Catholic University of America Press. 
Hoye, W. (2004): The Idea of Truth as the Basis for Religious Tolerance According to 
Nicholas of Cusa with Comparisons to Thomas Aquinas. In: Bocken, I. (ed.): Confl ict 
and Reconciliation. Perspectives on Nicholas of Cusa. Leiden, Brilll, 161–176.
Meuthen, E. (1994): Nikolaus von Kues und die deutsche Kirche am Vorabend der Re-
formation. In: Kremer, K., Reinhart, K. (eds.): Nikolaus von Kues, Kirche und Re-
spublica Christiana. Konkordanz, Repräsentanz und Konsens. Trier, Paulinus Verlag, 
39–85. 
Nagel, Th. (1986): The View from Nowhere. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Watanabe, M. (2001): Concord and Discord. Nicholas of Cusa as a Legal and Political 
Thinker. In: Yamaki, K. (ed.): Nicholas of Cusa. A Medieval Thinker for the Modern 
Age. Richmond, Curzon, 47–59. 
Inigo BOCKEN: THE THIRD PARTY IS NECESSARILY INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT ..., 119–126
